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Abstract
This paper analyses Chinese sub-national governments’ implementation
strategies to meet national energy efficiency targets in the 11th Five-Year
Plan (2006–2010). Previous research has focused on the ways governance
practices and decision-making structures shape implementation outcomes,
yet very little attention has been given to what strategies local leaders actually
employ to bridge national priorities with local interests. To illustrate how
local leaders work politically, this paper highlights specific implementation
methods officials use to strengthen formal incentives and create effective
informal incentives to comply with energy efficiency mandates. The analysis
is drawn from 53 interviews conducted in June and July of 2010 in Shanxi, a
major coal-producing and energy-intensive province. Findings suggest that
local government leaders conform to national directives by “bundling” the
energy efficiency policy with policies of more pressing local importance or
by “bundling” their energy efficiency objectives with the interests of groups
with significant political influence. Ultimately, sub-national government
officials frame policies in ways that give them legitimacy at the local level.
Keywords: policy implementation; central–local relations; energy; informal
incentives; climate change; China
Introduction
Secure energy resources and their intelligent use are keys to China’s continued,
rapid development. The country recently overtook the United States as the
world’s largest energy consumer, according to an International Energy Agency
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(IEA) estimate1 and, as China’s citizens become wealthier, concerns about their
increasing consumption capability and the consequent production and energy
consumption growth will continue into the coming decades. This energy consump-
tion growth has wide implications for the air pollution, greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions, and energy scarcity crises facing China and the world. The prioritiza-
tion of issues by the international community and China may vary as there is
much more emphasis on climate change and pollution outside of China, while
concerns about economic growth and energy security take precedence domesti-
cally, but China’s energy policy will increasingly find itself on the top of national
and international policy agendas. China has begun to address energy consumption
growth concerns through its 11th Five-Year Plan energy intensity2 reduction tar-
gets, including introducing the self-imposed national target of a 20 per cent
reduction in energy intensity against 2005 levels by 2010. However, at the sub-
national levels, socioeconomic and political benefits from decreased local energy
consumption and decreased emissions are not foregone conclusions and energy
efficiency may receive less priority despite this national emphasis. While sustained
economic growth based on continued availability of energy resources and environ-
mental pollution problems are important issues for the country as a whole, local
governments may be more willing and able to manage short-term, local problems
such as enterprise cash flow difficulties, attracting foreign and domestic invest-
ment, and social stability concerns. These problems are more self-contained and
manageable, with clearer and more direct local benefits, than issues that require
significant collective action like energy policy implementation.
This paper thus examines the means through which local governments
implement energy efficiency policy. The main hypothesis is that local govern-
ments seek to implement national administrative directives by combining the
energy consumption management policy with policies of greater or more pressing
importance for the local government, a tactic which we term “policy-bundling,”
or by linking their energy efficiency objectives with the immediate interests of
different actors to improve the implementation of one or more policies, which
we term “interest-bundling.” Officials often opt to “kill two (or more) birds
with one stone” by choosing implementation pathways that balance local priori-
ties with national targets and are more likely to faithfully implement energy con-
servation policies and projects which also address salient business, economic,
safety, pollution, and political legitimacy interests and concerns in their local con-
stituencies. Local governments are less likely to strictly implement energy conser-
vation policies that lack “bundling” potential and will employ foot-dragging
measures such as seeking loopholes in the implementation guidelines.
Shanxi province was chosen as the research region as it is well-known for
its coal production and large proportion of energy-intensive enterprises. Both
enterprise sizes and ownership structures vary across Shanxi, with more state
1 International Energy Agency (IEA) 2010.
2 Energy intensity is the energy consumption per unit GDP.
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ownership and larger enterprises in the north and more private ownership and
smaller enterprises in the south. The scale of industrial production and energy
consumption in Shanxi make energy savings and emissions reduction (ESER)
policy especially pressing and relevant for the province. Nevertheless, the lack
of a diversified industrial structure and decreased employment opportunities
make implementation of ESER policy difficult, especially given that Shanxi
has fewer opportunities than other regions in China such as coastal regions or
areas most benefited by the “Open Up the West” policies.
In the 11th Five-Year Plan, Shanxi was assigned an energy intensity reduction
goal of 25 per cent by 2010 compared to the 2005 level, which is higher than the
national target of 20 per cent. Figures provided in recent Shanxi Provincial
Economic Commission reports show the province as being on track to meet or
surpass its 11th Five-Year Plan energy intensity targets.3 However, the specifics
of this successful implementation have not been studied, and this research shows
that local officials’ interests and incentives have been key to these policy outcomes.
The analysis is drawn from 53 interviews conducted in the provincial capital,
five municipalities, and eleven counties during June and July 2010. The majority
of interviewees were officials from Economic Commissions, Environmental
Protection Bureaus, Development and Reform Commissions, and Construction
Bureaus, as well as industrial enterprise managers involved in energy intensity
reduction and efficiency programs. Interviews were semi-structured and provided
an understanding of overall implementation at the provincial, municipal, and
county levels through the study of local circumstances, along with insight into
the similarities and variations in implementation among localities. The analysis
also draws from government policy documents and reports, ESER statistics, stat-
istical yearbook data, and internal enterprise energy consumption statistics.
The next section introduces concepts and arguments relevant to understanding
the implementation of national ESER policies at the local level. The subsequent
discussion provides an overview of national energy efficiency efforts since 2006
and describes the local policy context in Shanxi province. The paper then ana-
lyses local players and interests in the implementation of two industrial energy
efficiency policies: the Shanxi Top-1000 Enterprise Program and the policy of
“elimination of backward production capacity” and small plant closure. The
research concludes by highlighting the politics of bundling as a common
implementation tactic at the local level and offering a brief discussion of the
implications of the findings.
Energy Efficiency Policy Implementation: Bundling and Framing
China’s energy efficiency programs at the national level have received a great deal
of attention in the public policy literature,4 yet an analysis of local
3 Shanxi sheng jingji he xinxihua weiyuanhui 2008; 2009; 2010.
4 Zhou, Levine and Price 2010; Meidan, Andrews-Speed and Ma 2009.
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implementation is essential for a full understanding of the national ESER initiat-
ive. Most China observers are well aware of gaps between the central govern-
ment’s official national policies and their practical outcomes at local levels.5
Often, a conflict exists between government levels because national policies at
times fail to take into account policies’ potential negative impacts on local
businesses, employment, and taxation revenues. National policies without suffi-
cient local support and legitimacy are only implemented strictly when there is
direct and constant attention from the center. Policy implementation outcomes
therefore often directly or indirectly relate to the differences between priorities
at the national level and local incentives.
Existing approaches focus on the ways governance practices and decision-
making structures shape implementation outcomes, yet very little research has
shown what strategies local leaders actually employ to bridge national priorities
with local interests. For energy efficiency policy implementation, the clearly
defined energy intensity reduction targets, the strict punishments through denial
of promotion and formal censure for government officials and enterprise man-
agers if they fail to meet them, and the high cost and at times redistributive nature
of energy efficiency improvements make ESER policy implementation a site of
political contestation.6 Specifically, percentage targets are rigid and ranged
from 12 per cent up to 30 per cent against 2005 levels. In order to meet targets,
officials from the Economic Commission negotiate with local enterprises to con-
vince managers to improve energy efficiency, whether or not such investments are
cost-efficient within a practical time horizon. At the same time, local implemen-
ters reorganize industrial structures by consolidating production capacity at the
most efficient enterprises or by reducing the share of energy-intensive production
in their constituencies through, for instance, promoting industries in the service
sector such as tourism.
To illustrate how leaders work politically, this paper highlights specific
implementation tactics that officials use to bring enterprises and the public on
board in support of their own professional objectives. The first practice is interest-
bundling, whereby government officials link their own political interests with the
economic and political interests of the large enterprises essential to both success-
ful implementation of the ESER policy and local economic growth. Officials
align their interests with those of state-owned enterprise (SOE) and large private
enterprise managers by communicating the importance of the ESER policy and
indicating the willingness of the local government to provide compensatory
benefits, such as assurance of uninterrupted business operation and preferential
access to land and funds for enterprises who comply. The specific incentivization
process is often flexible, open to negotiation, and depends on an exchange of
5 For a discussion on the “environmental implementation gap” in China’s highly decentralized and frag-
mented governing structure, see Lieberthal and Oksenberg 1988; Economy 2004; van Rooij 2006;
Kostka and Hobbs forthcoming; Ran 2009.
6 For an in-depth description of the ambiguity-conflict model of implementation, see Matland 1995.
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benefits outside of the formal incentive structure. It hinges on the provision,
explicit or implicit, of compensatory benefits, and is dependent upon the level
of enticement, appeasement, or pressure needed to make enterprises’ incentives
to improve energy efficiency on par with those of the implementing officials
who will be rewarded or promoted for the enterprise achievements. Officials
also take competing interests such as economic growth and employment into con-
sideration during implementation, as such factors also affect government offi-
cials’ evaluations. This interest-bundling approach turns energy efficiency
policy implementation into a somewhat cooperative venture and avoids adversar-
ial relationships with important local enterprises. This interest “bundling” is
somewhat comparable to “logrolling” in American politics, which occurs when
legislators trade votes in exchange for cooperation on other issues.7 The main
difference between interest-bundling and logrolling is that bundling occurs
most often in policy implementation rather than during policy formulation.
For energy efficiency bundling, local officials and enterprises cooperate on
energy efficiency in exchange for compensatory benefits for the enterprises on
other issues.
The second implementation practice is policy bundling. Some ESER policies
are implemented as parts of larger campaigns, and connected with policies and
concerns of more local or immediate interest like local pollution control or
work supervision and safety. At other times, their implementation may be
implicitly tied to formally unrelated policies with greater public emphasis and
stronger official support. These approaches increase public support and lessen
resistance to implementation. The third tool is framing, a concept that originates
from sociological research.8 Linguistic reframing of policies allows officials to
shape public perceptions.9 In this study, research suggests that local leaders
frame by conceptualizing and describing energy efficiency policies in ways that
play to interests in their localities. This helps to create coalitions to support
implementation of initiatives which are prima facie detrimental to interest groups
or the public in general. Through these methods, municipal and county officials
with unambiguous incentives to meet energy intensity target reductions can bal-
ance national and provincial demands with local interests. At the same time, they
bundle ESER policy in ways that make it relevant to concerns of greater local
importance. Ultimately, local officials frame policies and programs of national
and international concern in ways that give them legitimacy at the local level.
In the following two sections, this paper introduces national and provincial-
level energy efficiency efforts, highlighting the formal policy structures. This
description also points out the shortfalls of formal incentives that necessitate pol-
icy implementation manoeuvres outside of these structures. The paper then
7 Johnson 2010.
8 Goffman 1974.
9 Scrase and Ockwell 2010.
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continues with a detailed analysis of the corresponding local implementation
manoeuvres and outcomes.
National Context: Energy Efficiency Efforts
Between 2002 and 2005, China’s energy intensity increased at an average of 3.8
per cent10 reversing a long-term trend of continuous energy efficiency improve-
ments. In response to this development, the central government in 2004 began
to introduce a series of policies, administrative plans, and laws to fill this gap
and strengthen energy conservation work. Most importantly, in 2006, the
Chinese central government introduced an ESER program, which relies on
administrative measures and tools deployed in China’s fragmented vertical and
horizontal (tiao tiao kuai kuai 条条块块) governance structure, the most impor-
tant of which are mandatory, “hard” (ying xing硬性) energy intensity reduction
targets for government departments and enterprises. Other administrative
measures and tools introduced between 2006 and 2008 are less stringent, but
also important. In concert with the introduction of the hard targets, the central
government also published a list of ten key energy-savings projects, ten key
“people’s projects,” energy efficiency guidelines and industry efficiency stan-
dards, along with other government documents to guide government and enter-
prise implementation of the energy efficiency policy.
As noted in the literature, hard targets in the cadre responsibility system are
generally reserved for economic growth goals and measurements of social stab-
ility.11 Energy policies of the 11th Five-Year Plan and the new developments
in cadre management thus reflect the great emphasis placed on energy saving
by the highest levels of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and State
Council, and can be considered a national reassessment of the “growth at any
cost” model previously pursued throughout the country. Yet, the ultimate success
or failure of national initiatives continues to depend on local implementation.
Beijing made it clear that faithful implementation of energy efficiency goals are
a national priority, but the ESER program, begun in 2006 and in earnest at the
provincial level in 2007, had a difficult start. Early government reports indicated
that most provinces fell far short of initial yearly energy intensity reduction tar-
gets, even in provinces with five-year targets of 12 to 18 per cent, much less those
with targets of up to 25 per cent.12 By the end of 2008, the country seemed on
track to meet its energy intensity reduction target of 20 per cent, but, in winter
2009, this trend reversed and energy intensity in China increased by 3.2 per
cent,13 bringing into question the nation’s ability to meet its goals. In May
2010, Chinese Premier Wen Jiabao called for local officials to use an “iron
10 Zhou, Levine and Price 2010.
11 Whiting 2001.
12 Zhou, Levine and Price 2010.
13 Office of the State Council 2010.
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hand” (tie de shouwan 铁的手腕) when implementing the ESER policy, pushing
the nation to ensure completion of its ESER targets stated in the 11th Five-Year
Plan.14
Local Context: Energy Efficiency Policy in Shanxi Province
Shanxi province has a high proportion of energy-intensive industry. In 2008,
overall industrial production accounted for 54 per cent of GDP and heavy indus-
try accounted for 81 per cent of provincial final energy consumption.15 This car-
ries with it implementation and transitional challenges, yet Shanxi has
nonetheless arguably successfully implemented ESER policy. The heads of the
Shanxi Economic Commission and Shanxi Development and Reform
Commission have formulated policies stricter than national requirements, and
the province is on track to meet its ESER goals. The success in meeting its energy
intensity reduction target is partly due to its preexisting industrial structure. For
example, heavy industries have more potential for energy savings, and large
industrial plants, prevalent in northern Shanxi and lacking in some other pro-
vinces, have scale advantages as some upgrades are impossible for smaller plants.
However, progress can be also attributed to the unprecedented provincial empha-
sis in the past five years.
Provincial practices overall heavily reflect policies at the national level. The
Shanxi People’s Government passed on the 11th Five-Year Plan’s provincial
2010 goal, of a 25 per cent reduction in energy intensity against 2005 levels, to
lower level governments and departments. The 2007 decision by the State
Council to turn energy intensity reduction into “hard targets” was outlined in
provincial policy in 2008. The provincial government also distributed its nation-
ally assigned goal of completing 4.6 million square meters of energy-saving build-
ing renovations to lower level governments and departments, along with
energy-efficient light bulb dissemination, district heating and other targets.16
Yet, provincial policy is not limited to national requirements. Shanxi leaders,
including the governor and heads of the Shanxi Economic Commission and the
Shanxi Development and Reform Commission, will be held responsible for pro-
gress in energy efficiency by the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan and therefore
have strong incentives to ensure completion of national efficiency requirements
when formulating Shanxi’s provincial policy. Provincial leaders went beyond
national requirements and made provincial ESER policy stricter than national
policy to ensure their completion, as leaders anticipated some local ESER efforts
would fail or would be discounted by national inspection teams. Provincial tar-
gets assigned by the national government were raised for municipalities, counties,
and enterprises to ensure completion of the overall provincial 11th Five-Year
14 Office of the State Council 2010.
15 Shanxi Province Bureau of Statistics 2009, Tables 1-11, 4-1.
16 Shanxi People’s Government Document No. 32 (September 2007) and No. 16 (June 2008).
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Plan target. In one municipality, for example, targets at the county level generally
ranged from 27 per cent to 30 per cent in energy intensity reduction.17 The
inflation of targets at the lower levels is a common practice in Chinese policy
campaigns. In supplement to national policies, Shanxi province introduced a
Top-200 Enterprise Program modeled after the national Top-1000 Enterprise
Program,18 which requires the most energy-consuming enterprises to sign energy
intensity reduction contracts with the provincial government. This provincial pro-
gram was later expanded to a provincial 1000 Enterprise Program after improved
energy-use calculations. These national and provincial top-enterprise programs
were intended to improve energy efficiency at the nation’s and province’s largest
energy-consuming enterprises. The Economic Commission also approved provin-
cial energy efficiency standards more stringent than national standards in some
industries such as steel and magnesium.19
These ambitious targets and policies created a provincial energy efficiency pol-
icy structure strongly in line with national interest, yet created implementation
difficulties, especially regarding funding. Given the expansion of energy effi-
ciency programs, Shanxi province uses its own provincial funds to finance local
energy efficiency projects. In particular, in 2007 the Shanxi People’s
Government created a “Coal Sustainable Development Fund” through taxation
of all provincial coal exports and since then has used part of this money to pro-
vide funding for energy-saving initiatives, in addition to projects to counteract the
detrimental impacts of coal extraction in the province.20 The establishment of this
fund took advantage of provincial interest and circumstance and bundled them
with both coal mining concerns and the ESER implementation incentives.
This Coal Sustainable Development Fund raises the price of exported Shanxi
coal, yet serves a number of purposes. First, it aims to soften the social and econ-
omic consequences of coal mining in Shanxi. Second, the tax and its use ensures
that other provinces benefiting from the use of Shanxi coal foot the bill for costs
not reflected in the price of coal. Third, it aims to raise the costs of exports and
keep Shanxi resources within the province to ensure greater GDP creation from
industrial processing, instead of low-wealth creation from exporting natural
resources. Fourth, and most importantly, it fills government coffers and greatly
enhances provincial policy implementation capacity in a number of key areas,
including city greening initiatives and ESER policy implementation. Between
March 2007 and the end of 2009, the fund reportedly collected over 43 billion
yuan.21
In addition, an alignment of interests was not limited to financial capacity
building, but also occurred during the formulation of the relatively stringent
industry efficiency standards. As mentioned above, Shanxi province enacted
17 Interview 21, July 2010, municipal Economic Commission official.
18 For an overview of the national program, see Price, Wang and Jiang 2010.
19 Interview 51, July 2010, provincial Economic Commission official.
20 Shanxi People’s Government Document No. 32 (September 2007).
21 Guo 2010.
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provincial energy efficiency standards in industries such as steel and magnesium
stricter than those set out at the national level. These provincial efficiency stan-
dards are created by the enterprises themselves giving them room to account
for their own interests. Although it seems counter-intuitive for enterprises to will-
ingly draft tough standards, especially when they are sufficiently stringent to lead
to cost increases, in fact, many large enterprises have incentives to create high
efficiency standards to squeeze small producers out of the industry and increase
their market share. One manager of a large magnesium enterprise, for example,
cited this as a major reason for supporting strict standards.22 Indeed, this enter-
prise pushed for standards approved in Shanxi to also be approved at the national
level, but met with resistance from enterprise owners in other provinces and from
national government officials concerned that they would limit growth in the
industry.
However, despite these funding and standard-setting factors some provincial
policies continued to run against local economic business interests. Many energy
efficiency methods promoted by the national and provincial governments pro-
vided few enterprise cost-savings, except in the very long term. This is especially
the case as compensation and subsidies continue to be insufficient. For example,
subsidies and rewards distributed by the provincial Development and Reform
Commission and sometimes by the municipal and county governments are con-
sidered “symbolic” and are not always given out in a consistent manner. When
subsidies are provided, they are given after the project completion, creating a
high level of uncertainty for enterprises considering energy-saving projects.
According to one municipal official, between 2007 and 2009 there were around
250 industrial projects to upgrade production efficiency in the municipality. Of
these, only 44 of the largest projects received subsidies that on average covered
between 20 and 30 per cent of the initial investment costs.23 Indeed, throughout
Shanxi, only economically and politically significant enterprises with very large
production capacity and relatively advanced production capability consistently
receive compensation, subsidies and rewards. As an indication of their scale,
these large plants usually employ several thousand workers.
Due to insufficient financial resources and policy aspects that ran in opposition
to local interests, the necessity for local officials to bundle provincial and national
interests with local interests remained. Among different ESER programs and
measures the most important and locally emphasized were the provincial
Top-1000 Enterprise Program, the “elimination of backward production
capacity” and small plant closure policy, industry energy efficiency standards,
and social “ten key projects” program such as efficient light bulb programs, dis-
trict heating and waste-water management, and energy-saving renovations in
residential housing. This paper will examine two of them – the Shanxi
Top-1000 Enterprise Program and the “elimination of backward production
22 Interview 45, July 2010, manager of large industrial enterprise.
23 Interview 28, July 2010, municipal Economic Commission official.
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capacity” and small plant closure policy – and analyse the extent to which bund-
ling of interests and policies, along with framing strategies for the interests and
concerns existent in localities, were used to address the challenges to implement-
ing ESER policy.
Local Implementation: Interest-Bundling, Policy-Bundling, and Framing
Shanxi Top-1000 Enterprise Program
The Top-1000 Enterprise Program in Shanxi is perhaps the most important com-
ponent of the ESER policy at the local level. Enterprises on the list account for 90
per cent of energy use in the province, according to calculations by the Shanxi
Provincial Economic Commission,24 and energy efficiency improvements at these
enterprises are the primary factor determining officials’ progress towards energy
intensity reduction hard targets. To implement the 1000 enterprise program,
local People’s Government officials sign responsibility contracts with the higher
level government committing themselves to energy intensity reductions in their jur-
isdictions, and then sign responsibility contracts with the enterprise managers on
the 1000 enterprise list, committing them to specific energy consumption targets.
Because the targets in the cadre responsibility system are tied to these agree-
ments, local leaders and officials have strong incentives to implement the
Top-1000 Enterprise policy. At the same time, however, they have limited willing-
ness and capacity to enforce targets and standards. Local county and municipal
leaders such as mayors and party secretaries have greater influence and implemen-
tation capacity than Economic Commission officials, but are not always willing to
give priority to the enforcement of ESER policy. Mayors and party secretaries
have many, sometimes conflicting, priorities and targets, and energy intensity tar-
gets are just one of them. As a result, Economic Commission officials often carry
out ESER policies without the mayor’s or party secretary’s unconditional support
for strict enforcement measures and must consider economic and political interests
of enterprises to ensure their cooperation.
In terms of supervision and enforcement capacity at the county level, usually
only one or two people in the Economic Commission are in charge of energy effi-
ciency at enterprises. The same officials are responsible for many different indus-
trial production and technology standards. With limited industry knowledge, it is
difficult for them to thoroughly evaluate the required energy reports delivered by
the enterprises. Even with greater human resources and skills, local Economic
Commission officials cannot effectively implement ESER policy without the sup-
port and cooperation of large energy-intensive enterprises, such as iron and steel,
24 Shanxi sheng jingji he xinxihua weiyuanhui 2010. This statistic was calculated using a broad definition
of the word “industrial.” The provincial Development and Reform Commission and the provincial
Construction Bureau went by different numbers. An official from the Construction Bureau, for example,
believed the number should be closer to one third, with transportation and housing taking up the
remaining two thirds (Interview 27, July 2010, provincial Construction Bureau official).
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non-ferrous metals and coking enterprises. The local governments can punish
enterprises which exceed industry efficiency standards by raising such enterprises’
electricity costs and ordering utility companies to cut off electricity and water, a
policy commonly referred to as “cut water cut electricity” (duanshui duandian断
水断电), but the legal basis for these punishments is tenuous, and enterprises can
resist or appeal their enforcement.
Given their limited willingness and ability to enforce the policy, local leaders
and officials often choose to bundle their own political interests with the econ-
omic and political interests of enterprise managers. Government officials ensure
and explain to managers the formal rules and incentives within the national and
provincial ESER policy such as provincial, and in some cases municipal, subsi-
dies and often also provide informal incentives and benefits outside the formal
implementation structure. Although the existence of subsidies and formal incen-
tives such as promotions are clear, subsidy and compensation applications are
complex and mistakes will result in denial of funding. Also, subsidies are limited
and enterprise managers may be doubtful that their applications will succeed.
Assurances and assistance from local officials can thus be essential to an enter-
prise manager’s confidence that ESER measures will receive compensation
from the government. On the informal side, when local officials and managers
have close relationships, personal or professional, they persuade enterprises of
benefits through unofficial means, such as personal appeals, preferential treat-
ment, and compensatory benefits for enterprises that make voluntary efforts to
reduce energy consumption. Managers of large and profitable enterprises with
strong party connections and the capacity to upgrade production improved
energy efficiency without the assurance of monetary compensation. For example,
one enterprise improved energy efficiency and only later received compensation
for each ton of saved energy after the adoption of a new national policy.25
Highlighting potential political, economic, or social benefits to be gained from
implementing ESER measures is one of the informal means employed by govern-
ment officials. Thus, government officials bundle their own political interests
such as evaluations and promotion opportunities with the economic and political
interests of enterprise managers, which vary according to enterprise forms of
ownership.
Formal and informal incentives and benefits differ for SOEs and private enter-
prises. For SOEs, managers are more easily incentivized to meet ESER targets as
they can be punished through political performance evaluations if they fall short
of their goals. They can be excluded from year-end bonuses and be subject to
other political punishments.26 Beyond this, SOE managers may also implement
the policies for perceived political benefit outside of the formal incentive struc-
ture. For some large SOE managers, the importance placed on energy efficiency
communicates an advancement opportunity. If they can significantly increase
25 Interview 45, July 2010, manager of large industrial enterprise.
26 Shanxi People’s Government Document No. 32 (September 2007).
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energy efficiency and increase GDP per unit of energy consumed, they may be
able to expect a number of political benefits and perhaps a promotion. For
example, it is common knowledge among Shanxi enterprise managers that the
former head of the largest iron and steel plant in Shanxi, Taiyuan Iron and
Steel (Taigang 太钢), was promoted to deputy governor of the province after
increasing efficiency and raising production standards at the company. In gen-
eral, political benefits such as promotions into prestigious government jobs are
the greatest incentives for officials and SOE managers as opposed to monetary
compensation incentives such as continued eligibility for year-end bonuses.
Political incentives, on the other hand, are not strong motivators for private
enterprise owners and instead compensatory benefits or other implicit exchanges
are offered to increase enterprises’ energy efficiency efforts. Private enterprises
primarily evaluated ESER policies based on profit-maximization criteria and
energy efficiency projects do not always result in significant cost-savings.
Accordingly, local officials often have to use signaling (observable indications
of policy preferences27) and persuasion to assure business managers of economic
benefits, which might include secure long-term operation, preferential treatment
for future expansion projects, and increased market share resulting from eventual
consolidation of production capacity to the most efficient enterprises. A key com-
ponent of the secure long-term operation incentive is continued access to local
financing. Local banks, although officially making decisions independently, com-
monly align loan decisions with interests of local mayors and party secretaries.28
Loans are thus tied to the loan preferences of local leaders, who are incentivized
to prioritize large, energy-efficient enterprises that met their ESER targets.
Therefore, for private enterprise, ESER interest-bundling is to some extent a
race to stay on the government’s good side and maintain preferential access to
government-provided resources. This rent-seeking behaviour induced by interest-
bundling is a major component of progress in energy efficiency implementation.
Informal assurances and actual political and economic incentives are some-
times not enough to convince enterprise managers to improve energy efficiency.
Some cases, especially in the final year of the 11th Five-Year Plan, require the
“iron hand” advocated by Premier Wen Jiabao. Officials thus sometimes seek
compromises to ensure enterprise managers will be as receptive as possible to
enforcement. One way that local governments can bundle their ESER “hard tar-
get” interests while also preventing long-term, undue harm to local interests is to
use a measure called “sleeping management” (xiumian guanli 休眠管理). For
example, by early 2010 local leaders in one county realized that they were not
able to meet their ESER targets set in the 11th Five-Year Plan because of a single
new coal power plant, which had greatly increased the overall energy intensity in
the county. The income from this new plant was important to the local economy
and government revenue, yet the detrimental impact on the energy intensity in the
27 Stern and O’Brien 2012.
28 Interview 16, July 2010, manager of private industrial enterprise.
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locality was undeniable. As a compromise, the local government therefore
required this enterprise and other energy-intensive enterprises which had greatly
exceeded energy consumption standards to close in rotation for several months at
the end of 2010. In this way, the local leaders hoped to satisfy their ESER targets
without actually having to close any of the concerned enterprises completely and
suffer the social and economic consequences that would result.
When bundling is not effective, officials resort to more coercive means.
Although local governments rarely resort to harsh punishments, they still use
them as very real threats for enterprises if the jurisdiction is close to falling
short of the officials’ ESER targets and the mayor and other high level officials
find themselves with their “backs to the wall.” Given tight personal networks
between government officials and larger enterprise managers, local enterprises
are aware of the importance of energy reduction to mayors and high level offi-
cials, even if they have little reason, legally or with respect to political influence,
to listen to the appeals of Economic Commission representatives. Signaling by
the government, often through informal channels such as former government
officials in management positions at large private enterprises, makes it clear to
private enterprises that if they do not comply with ESER policies they will cer-
tainly be punished. For large enterprises which reduce energy consumption, the
signaling from the government officials also assures them that when they increase
costs in the short term they will not be undercut by other enterprises who avoid
energy-saving renovations. In this way, they can anticipate that if noncompliant
enterprises cut corners to take away market share, they will be punished or even
closed. Noncompliant enterprises are often closed relatively late; despite this, the
preemptive bundling of energy efficiency policy with formally unrelated incen-
tives provides the benefits for enterprises to implement upgrades early.
Policy of “elimination of backward production capacity” and small plant closure
The second major and perhaps most reported ESER effort in Shanxi is the push
to close inefficient and energy-intensive production lines and small industrial
enterprises. To implement it, the Economic Commission in a county or munici-
pality identifies enterprises that violate national and provincial guidelines on
industrial equipment and production scale standards. After receiving the
approval of the mayor, local Economic Commissions publish lists of enterprises
or production lines that do not meet energy efficiency requirements and list time
frames for “voluntary” closure. Some closed enterprises or enterprises that shut
down outdated production equipment receive compensation of around 20 to 30
per cent of the closed enterprise or production line value, but the majority of
such enterprises do not.29 Although the definition varies across sectors, a small
enterprise in China generally has fewer than 2000 employees and less than 300
29 Interview 28, July 2010, municipal Economic Commission official; Interview 13, July 2010, county
Development and Reform Commission official.
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million yuan in sales.30 However, the small enterprises discussed in this section
have at most several hundred employees and the closed plants, of which many
are satellites of larger enterprises, often employ from 30 to 100 workers. Those
enterprises and plants which were closed were often too small in terms of pro-
duction scale or without financial capability to upgrade. When implementing
the plant and production-line closure policy, local governments are more likely
to resort to differentiated electricity pricing and cutting off electricity and
water, especially for small enterprises. In some cases, local mayors can ask the
Security Bureau to send police officers to assist with forced closures, along
with the removal and destruction of factory equipment. One case in which strict
forms of enforcement were used prior to the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan
was in response to a “regional investment restriction” (quyu xianpi 区域限批)
punishment imposed by the national government that restricted the approvals
of all new energy-intensive projects for three months. To placate the national gov-
ernment, local leaders ordered one electricity company to cut off electricity to
over 70 enterprises31 in order to have the investment restrictions lifted.
For most cases at the local level, there are fewer incentives to undertake this
kind of strict enforcement, and local officials must consider local economic
growth, employment, and social concerns. Major economic drawbacks of the
small enterprise closures are that they decrease local GDP, tax revenue and
employment numbers. Local officials partially remedy these effects by adding
capacity at large, relatively efficient enterprises. Within large enterprises,
approval for new production lines is normally contingent on the closure of out-
dated production capacity, a national policy.32 In some localities, enterprises
were granted extensions while the new production facilities and equipments
were under construction.
In areas with few sources of local income and no large enterprises, incentiviza-
tion was more difficult and local leaders were willing to make allowances for the
economic and social stability of the locality. Many local officials anticipated
strong opposition to plant closure. In one reportedly isolated incident, for
example, a local factory owner organized an employee protest in response to
the coming closure of his enterprise. This situation resulted in the government
“persuading” the owner and his employees that the closure was in the interest
of the locality and that they would be provided re-employment opportunities.33
To avoid possible government–enterprise conflict, local governments take
preemptive measures to decrease costs of implementation for local interests.
For one small town with a single large industrial plant, the county and municipal
officials allowed a small, inefficient plant to stay open because of its importance
in the local economy. This was done only after making sure the plant owners
30 Guojia jingji maoyi weiyuan hui 2003.
31 China Economic Weekly 2007.
32 The national “Link small unit closures to large unit construction approvals” policy.
33 Interview 38, July 2010, municipal Economic Commission official.
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realized that they were being done a favour which they must return by making
serious efforts to increase energy efficiency if they were to stay open. At the
same time, local leaders emphasized that this was a temporary solution only,
and that the enterprise must close eventually. In another case, a high profile
closure, one local mayor brought together representatives from a number of
the local departments to ensure that employees losing their jobs would be
cared for by the government, and then arranged that they were provided
re-employment and other forms of assistance. Some local officials also aligned
their interests with those of small enterprise owners and gave enterprises the
option of being able to sell or keep their equipment if they voluntarily closed
ahead of the final date for closure,34 as opposed to being forced to remove and
destroy equipment as set out in national policy. In this way, enterprise managers
were given an incentive to implement the policy themselves, making highly visible
government intervention unnecessary.
Local officials avoided conflict in the policy implementation of “elimination of
backward production capacity” and small plant closure when they bundled
implementation with another policy. Plant closure was implemented together
with the environmental clean-up prior to the 2008 Olympics, with campaigns
to improve work supervision and tax collection, and with a pollution-reduction
policy. First, ESER plant closures were at times carried out in conjunction
with the 2008 Olympics clean-up policy, although the link between the two pol-
icies did not become apparent to small enterprise owners until after the event.
Local officials asked enterprises to close in the name of the Olympics, but were
aware that national and provincial policy would allow them to prevent these
enterprises from re-opening. Many small plants which had thought they would
only stop production during the lead up to the Olympics and would be allowed
to resume where they left off were kept from doing so by the new policies restrict-
ing energy-intensive production.35 Others were unable to reopen due to the econ-
omic climate following the global financial crisis.36
Beyond the Olympics policy-bundling, small enterprise closures were also car-
ried out as part of a greater campaign against “low quality” small enterprise
managers. The primary goals of this campaign were to improve work supervision
and tax collection, yet it was loosely tied to mine closures, a policy with greater
backing from high-level governments. In these cases, lack of clarity worked to the
local officials’ advantage, even though the plant closures were primarily ESER
policy. Local officials improved regulatory capacity in local safety and tax collec-
tion, key areas for local governments, while avoiding confrontation which could
count against them if any social stability concerns arose.
In addition to these methods, the prioritization of small plant closures took
into account the relative pollution emitted by different industries, as all local
34 Interview 9, June 2010, county Economic Commission official.
35 Interview 45, July 2010, manager of private industrial enterprise.
36 Interview 51, July 2010, provincial Economic Commission official.
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officials were evaluated on SO2 emission reduction goals in addition to energy
intensity reductions, and some localities faced pressure from provincial and, in
some cases, national authorities to improve air quality. Specifically, local officials
prioritized closing cement or iron and steel small plants as they benefited local
officials’ emissions reduction goals significantly more than other industries.
Two county official interviewees stated that as long there were enough cement
or iron and steel enterprises in the county that officials could close, the locality
would easily meet its SO2 emissions reduction goals.37
Bundling of interests and policies in the closures of small coal mines was stron-
ger than in other industries. Small coal mines have much higher rates of fatalities
than large, state-owned coal enterprises38; there was increasing national media
coverage of coal mine accidents in recent years; and, perhaps most importantly,
beginning in 2006, the central and Shanxi provincial government renewed cam-
paigns to force buyouts of small coal mines by large, often state-owned, enter-
prises as part of promoting enterprises “getting bigger and stronger” (zuo da
zuo qiang 做大做强). Of more relevance to ESER policy, small coal mines have
lower extraction rates than large mines, and improving the overall extraction
rates in a locality counts as “saving energy” in cadre evaluations. The combi-
nations of these factors, and in spite of the often close relations between local offi-
cials and small mine owners, brought about a shift in local officials’ willingness to
close small mining operations. Local officials and coal bosses saw the policy’s
implementation as inevitable as the national and international media coverage
of mining disasters in concert with great attention from the CCP’s leadership
and the State Council highlighted the social and political prioritization of the pol-
icy. It was seen as only a matter of time, rather than a question of whether it
would be enforced.
State-owned mining companies greatly benefit from the coal mine closure pol-
icy. National policy requires the consolidation of coal mines to the largest produ-
cers39 and renationalization of coal resources in some regions is a top national
priority. Coal SOEs are thus able to buy out a very profitable industry, one
much more profitable than industrial production, at little cost and are able to
regain control of energy resources, giving them and the government leverage
over energy-use activities from their source. In return, they provide large bases
of coal production upon which to start mine production capacity consolidation,
resulting in precedents for other regions to follow.
This policy met with harsh resistance from mine bosses (meilaoban煤老板) and
other mining interests, as the government offered very low compensation for buy-
outs and mergers and the private owners were left with only a fraction of the
value of their enterprises.40 Yet, it was still strictly enforced. After initially
37 Interview 8, June 2010, county Environmental Protection Bureau official; Interview 9, June 2010,
county Economic Commission official.
38 Wang 2006.
39 National Development and Reform Commission 2007.
40 Geng 2009.
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resisting the mergers and buyouts, private coal mines began to formulate strat-
egies to play to the interests of local governments and, in doing so, “buy time”
before being forced out of the industry. These strategies focused on improving
the enterprises’ image of social responsibility and general benefit to society.
Coal enterprises built parks and funded rural education and employment pro-
grams to position themselves with the government as “good” enterprises, and
thus deserving to be among the last to undergo merger or buyout.41 This
rent-seeking behaviour saw some success and some enterprises could delay sched-
uled plant closures. In the end, however, these enterprises knew that they could
not exert enough political influence to counteract the confluence of interests
aligned against them.
The use of policy framing
In both the Shanxi Top-1000 Enterprise Program and the policy of “elimination
of backward production capacity” and small plant closure, officials often frame
their ideas in order to play to local interests. The Top-1000 Enterprise Program
and the “elimination of obsolete production capacity” and small plant closure
policy are conceptualized by local officials as upgrading and production capacity
restructuring programs. This framing is also used to emphasize that the ESER
policies will provide social benefits in the long-run, such as more local employ-
ment opportunities and improved workplace safety.
Within this framework, the general view of local officials is that the responsi-
bility of the Economic Commission, and the Development and Reform
Commission is to shift production capacity from small or under-performing
enterprises to large, efficient enterprises which can produce the greatest GDP
with the lowest relative energy consumption. This conceptualization is officially
based on the national policy of tying an enterprise’s large project approval to its
small production line closures. Yet at the local level, the policy is unofficially
expanded from a shift of production capacity within a single enterprise to an
inter-enterprise shift of production capacity from small enterprises, which are
often closed, to large enterprises, which correspondingly expand production.
Often, beneficiaries of this are state-owned or politically influential large private
enterprises with access to provincial “elimination of obsolete capacity” compen-
sation and technology-upgrade subsidies, given only to very large energy-saving
projects, especially those which document savings over 10,000 tons of standard
coal equivalent. Under ideal settings, local officials conceive that this shift
could result in new local production greater than the eliminated capacity, higher
local value-added due to greater local processing instead of exports to other pro-
vinces or municipalities for processing, and better government–enterprise
relations resulting from greater tax collection. They also aim to cause little
41 Interview 37, July 2010, manager of private coal mine.
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damage to the local economy and employment. The latter is possible even in the
short term as employees of closed enterprises are generally rural migrant workers
and not counted in employment statistics.
This framing is perhaps crucial to providing justification for the policies which
benefit influential enterprises and individuals, especially when it seems insuffi-
cient to a local official to simply explain that large enterprises are always more
efficient. They are presented as being in line with provincial policies to consoli-
date production capacity and increase production at the most advanced enter-
prises to develop “local champions,” and to avoid providing assistance to
small enterprises that are hard to regulate. Several local government interviewees
emphasized that although many small enterprises were or will be forced to stop
production, most large enterprises had created increased production capacity
by the end of 2008.42 For example, according to one county-level official in
charge of closures of small enterprises, the local government closed 30 small
energy-intensive plants, but these closed plants each had only around one million
to two million yuan total investment and around 20 to 30 employees. Although
this would mean that 600–900 employees lost their jobs, the official stressed that
the closure had little effect on the overall local economy.43 In another locality,
one county official stated that 15 out of 37 coke plants had closed, yet large
coke enterprises added more production capacity than was eliminated through
plant closure policies.44 This official emphasized that although many plants
had been closed, overall production capacity had increased, future profits
would be greater and tax revenues would correspondingly increase, and that
the locality had improved the overall “quality” of its enterprise owners by push-
ing small enterprise managers out of heavy industry.
Conclusion
China’s energy savings and emissions reduction policies at the national level are
ambitious, and they are even bolder at the provincial level in Shanxi. These
efforts reflect China’s national reassessment of the “growth at any cost” model
and the turn towards a more sustainable, environmentally friendly, and energy-
secure growth path. In Shanxi, energy consumption reduction concerns have
arguably been greater priorities than in other regions in China. However, the ulti-
mate success or failure of ESER policies continues to depend on local implemen-
tation. Given entrenched interests and the many, and sometimes seemingly
conflicting, demands placed upon officials, implementation of ESER policies is
difficult and requires officials to find compromises with large enterprise players
and to consolidate local support by forming ad-hoc coalitions.
42 Interview 31, July 2010, county Economic Commission official; Interview 36, July 2010, county
Economic Commission official; Interview 44, July 2010, county economic official.
43 Interview 36, July 2010, county Economic Commission official.
44 Interview 31, July 2010, county Economic Commission official.
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Not all sub-national governments have been successful in completing ESER
targets. In the months leading up to the end of the 11th Five-Year Plan, the cen-
tral government increased pressure on these local governments considerably to
ensure completion of the national 20 per cent energy intensity reduction target.
As a last minute response, some sub-national governments undertook drastic
measures to meet their energy intensity goals in ways harmful to the public inter-
est. For example, in one county in Hebei province, the local government cut off
electricity to hospitals, homes and rural villages, even to the extent that one hos-
pital was forced to close once every four days.45 Such methods in Hebei and other
regions forced NDRC to issue an emergency note in September 2010 which
banned short-term electricity cuts and production limitation methods that affect
residential areas and public services.46
A number of factors determine a province’s ability to meet its energy intensity
reduction targets, but, even under the best circumstances, local officials cannot
rely only on the formal incentives and guidelines included in the national energy
policies to meet targets. This research suggests that some regions such as Shanxi,
for which energy consumption is especially prominent because of the high pro-
portion of heavy industry, largely avoided a harsh, eleventh hour approach by
preemptively bundling national policies with different local business and political
interests. Bundling potential varies regionally given different local circumstances.
In Shanxi, the many important large industrial enterprises and small competitors
offer opportunities for governments to work cooperatively to protect local
business interests while at the same time meeting their energy intensity targets.
In Shanxi’s case, local officials bundled and built implementation capacity by
strengthening formal and creating informal incentives to bring enterprise interests
to improve energy efficiency on par with their own. This improved the implemen-
tation of some policies such as the Top-1000 Enterprise Program, and the “elim-
ination of backward production capacity” and plant closure policy. This
bundling and the compensatory benefits involved depended upon the communi-
cation, explanation, and assurance of formal incentives and the use of informal
means such as personal appeals, persuasion, and informal promises. In so
doing, government officials brought the interests of local enterprises in line
with the national directives to reduce energy use. To overcome the challenges
of closing energy inefficient small industrial enterprises and production lines,
local implementers took into consideration the economic and employment inter-
ests of their localities to soften the landing of enforcement. Officials bundled
energy efficiency policy with policies of greater local importance to ensure
smooth and “harmonious” realization of energy goals, and took advantage of
windows of opportunities such as the Olympics and the economic downturn to
decrease the risk of protests and other forms of opposition to government inter-
vention. Cadres’ linguistic reframing of the national energy policy goals and its
45 Li 2010.
46 Shanghai Zhangquan Bao 2010.
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implementation provided the rationale for steps taken seemingly against the local
interest. Officials used this framing to convert national energy-saving policies
from a conservation-oriented and restrained development framework into local
growth models aimed at creating expanded production, improving enterprise
competitiveness, ensuring stable employment, and addressing growing regulatory
demands at the local level.
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